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Abstract: We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation when exec-
utives have private information about their ability. We assume that the joint distribution of
an individual ﬁrm’s proﬁt and market movements depends on the ability of the executive that
runs the ﬁrm. In the equilibrium of the executive labor market, compensation schemes exploit
this fact to sort executives of diﬀerent abilities. This implies that executive compensation is
increasing in own performance, but may also be increasing in industry performance—a sharp
departure from standard relative performance evaluation. This result provides an explanation
for the scarcity of relative performance considerations in executive compensation documented
by the empirical literature.
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1 Introduction
Academics, practitioners and the business press frequently recommend the use of relative performance
evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation packages. RPE is normally taken to mean that executive
compensation is increasing in own performance and decreasing in performance of an appropriately deﬁned
peer group. RPE may be seen as a consequence of Holmström’s (1979, 1982) informativeness principle that
stipulates that in a principal-agent relationship all informative signals should be included in contracting:
“one can improve risk sharing while at the same time retaining incentives.”1 When designing executive
compensation, this principle may be argued to imply that “managers are not held responsible for events
one can observe are outside of their control, and [...] their performance is always judged against information
about what should be achievable given, say, the current economic situation.”2
These principles are very popular in the business press. According to Rappaport (1999): “Shareholders
expect boards to reward management for achieving superior returns—that is, for returns equal to or better
than those earned by the company’s peer group or by broader market indexes.”3 Dobbs and Koller (2000)
warn that “compensations plans linking the pay of managers to the share values of their companies can
reward or penalize them for events they don’t control.”4 For The Economist (2002) “rewards linked to a
company share price should probably be triggered only if the ﬁrm outperforms the market as a whole, or
an industry peer group.”5 The Financial Economist Roundtable maintains that “executives should not be
∗Marco Celentani gratefully acknowledges the ﬁnancial support of Fundación BBVA, Fundación Ramón Areces, and MCYT
(Spain) under project BEC2002-03715. Rosa Loveira gratefully acknowledges the ﬁnancial support of MCYT (Spain) under
project BEC2002-03715. We thank Pier Paolo Battigalli, Alberto Bennardo, Alberto Bisin, Michele Boldrin, Guillermo
Caruana, Francesco De Sinopoli, Jordi Jaumandreu, Belén Jerez, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Pablo Ruiz-Verdú and Seminar
Participants at Università Bocconi, Universidad Carlos III, and Ente Einaudi for useful discussions and suggestions.
†Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Getafe (Madrid) 28903, Spain; fax +34-91-624 9875;
marco.celentani@uc3m.es.
‡Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Getafe (Madrid) 28903, Spain and Department of Economics and
Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Carrer Ramón Trías Fargas, 23-27, 08005, Barcelona, Spain; fax: +34-93-542 1746;
rosa.loveira@upf.edu.
1Holmström (1979), page 87.
2Holmström (1979), page 82.
3Rappaport (1999), page 92.
4Dobbs and Koller (2000), page 190.
5The Economist (2002), page 25.
1rewarded or punished for outcomes that are beyond their control” and that their “compensation schemes
may include some form of indexation as a means of relating pay to the component of performance that is
more directly within the control of executives.”6
Despite the general praise of RPE, the extensive empirical research dedicated to its study has pro-
duced surprisingly little evidence of a negative relationship between executive compensation and market
movements. Some studies have even found a positive relationship.7 Summarizing the results of the empir-
ical investigation on RPE, Murphy (1999) says that “the paucity of RPE considerations in [...] executive
compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding.” According to Hall and Liebman (1998) “the near
complete absence of relative pay seems to be a puzzle.”8 Recent reviews of the compensation literature,
Abowd and Kaplan (1999) and Prendergast (1999), also indicate the lack of RPE as a major unsettled
problem.
The absence of RPE in executive compensation has also been noted by the business press which has
frequently expressed dissatisfaction with current compensation practices. The Economist (2002) asks “If a
ﬁrm’s share price goes up for extraneous reasons-a fall in interest rates, say, or a rise in the stock market-
why should the managers beneﬁt?”9 de Swaan and Harper (2003) note that “In case after case, investors
have seen executives reap extraordinary rewards tied to share price increases that had little to do with
management and everything to do with factors beyond its control, such as interest rate movements and
changes in macroeconomic conditions.”
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a theoretical model to study executive compensation
and to show that RPE is an important compensation tool, but that it may take a form that diﬀers from
the one advocated by the existing literature. In particular, we show that there are cases in which executive
compensation is increasing in market performance.
We study a situation in which ﬁrms compete for risk averse managers who have private information
about their individual ability. The probability distribution over a ﬁrm’s performance depends on the
ability of its manager, but also on a common aggregate state (when the aggregate state is favorable, a ﬁrm
is more likely to experience success). To avoid unnecessary complications we assume that the individual
performance and the aggregate state are both publicly observable and we allow executive compensation to
be made dependent on both.
We ﬁnd that in contracts accepted in equilibrium executive compensation depends on own performance
and on the aggregate state, but that it may be increasing in the latter, in the sense that executive compen-
sation may be higher when the aggregate state is favorable and therefore when aggregate performance is
higher. The intuition behind our result can be explained as follows. Managers of diﬀerent abilities generate
diﬀerent probability distribution over states, i.e., over pairs of individual and aggregate performance. This
implies that no equilibrium may exist in which both types of manager accept the same contract. If this
were the case, a ﬁrm could proﬁt from screening out a good manager by oﬀering a contract that increases
compensation in a state which is relatively more likely for the good manager and decreases it in a state
which is relatively less likely for him.
If an equilibrium exists, then, it has to be separating in the sense that the contracts accepted by the two
types are diﬀerent. These results are reminiscent of the insurance market with adverse selection studied by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). As in that case, risk aversion implies that in equilibrium
the bad manager accepts a contract that fully insures him. The contract accepted by the good type is the
contract that the good type most prefers among the ones that break even, and are such that the bad type
prefers his own contract.
In Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) the good type has incomplete insurance and therefore has higher
consumption in the state that is relatively more likely for him, i.e., the no-loss state. In a similar way, we
ﬁnd that compensation to the good manager is higher in states that are relatively more likely for him than
for the bad type. But we also ﬁnd that, because of correlation between market and individual outcomes,
the likelihood of a given level of own performance with a favorable aggregate state relative to the same
6Financial Economist Roundtable (2003), page 7.
7See, for instance Antle and Smith (1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Barro and Barro (1990), Janakirman, Lambert
and Larcker (1992), Joh (1999), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a and b). For additional discussion of the empirical literature,
refer to the surveys of Rosen (1992), Prendergast (1999) or Murphy (1999).
8Hall and Liebman (1999), page 683, footnote 34.
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2level of performance with an unfavorable aggregate state may be higher for a good manager than for a bad
one. This implies that the contract accepted in equilibrium by a good manager may stipulate that for a
given level of own performance executive compensation is higher with a favorable than with an unfavorable
aggregate state. In other words, we ﬁnd that executive compensation is increasing in the ﬁrm’s absolute
performance but is not necessarily decreasing with industry performance. We analyze the implications of
our results by running a regression on the data generated by the model and we show that our results can
generate a positive relationship between executive compensation and aggregate performance.
Our results show that principle of not rewarding or punishing executives for events beyond their control
needs to be read cautiously. If one takes the view that this principle means that compensation should be
decreasing in market performance, our results show that the principle does not hold in a very simple and
standard environment. A less simplistic reading would view the principle as popularizing the idea that the
optimal provision of incentives requires compensation schemes that evoke a statistical interpretation. This
means that compensation has to be higher when there is more evidence that the agent has acted as the
principal wished (as in a moral hazard environment) or that he is of a desirable type (as in an adverse
selection environment). When viewed in these more general terms, the principle, however, may produce
opposite recommendations for diﬀerent environments.
For example, when corporate performance is additive in a market shock component, it seems reasonable
to ﬁlter out market risk by rewarding the executive when market performance is bad and punishing him
when market performance is good, as often advocated. But in an adverse selection example that we
analyze in the paper, conditional on individual success, a good manager may be paid more when market
performance is good rather than bad. Rewarding the executive with individual success and a favorable
aggregate state may contradict conventional wisdom, but seems justiﬁed if this combination of own and
aggregate performance provides compelling evidence that he has given the contribution that only a good
executive can give.
Holmström’s (1979 and 1982) Informativeness Principle formalized the idea that the provision of incen-
tives may be improved by making pay contingent on market performance, but it gave no indication of the
sign of this relationship. Several authors interested in the relationship between executive compensation
and market movements have acknowledged this ambiguity. For Antle and Smith (1986) "the shape of the
contract is a function of properties of the monitoring system, the utility functions of the principal and the
agent, the production environment, and the cost of writing contingencies into the contracts. Not all of
these parameters are observable by the researcher." Gibbons and Murphy (1990) also warn that "agency
theory predicts that compensation will depend on relative performance evaluation but gives little guidance
as to the form of the contract."
Even in the absence of unambiguous theoretical guidance, empirical research has tried to assess whether
executive compensation is monotonically increasing or decreasing in market movements and has found
mixed results.10 The apparent absence of RPE considerations in executive compensation has received a
great deal of attention in recent empirical and theoretical research.
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) and Core and Guay (2002) have pointed out that the exposure to risk
of executive compensation packages is only part of executives’ total exposure to risk. When executive
compensation does not ﬁlter out market risk, the executive can reduce his exposure to market risk by
reducing the exposure to risk of the rest of his ﬁnancial wealth. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) ﬁnd some
evidence of RPE for younger executives, who are likely to be less able to ﬁlter out market risk because they
have less wealth.
Several authors have proposed the idea that, because compensation inﬂuences managers’ decisions in
product markets, optimal managerial compensation should take into account this eﬀect when ﬁrms operate
in imperfectly competitive markets. This idea, ﬁrst proposed by Salas Fumás (1992), has been pursued
by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) and by Joh (1999) that have found empirical evidence of managerial
compensation being increasing in industry performance rather than decreasing. They also ﬁnd that the
sensitivity of managerial compensation to industry performance is larger in more competitive environments.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) reconcile this ﬁnding with price rather than quantity competition and Joh
(1999) underlines that the usefulness of strategic group performance evaluation (in opposition to RPE) to
sustain collusion in product markets is larger in a more competitive setting.
10See the references in footnote 7.
3Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that executive compensation is best explained as rent extrac-
tion subject to a constraint on the ““outrage” [executive] pay packages would create.” Market or sector
indexing are argued to be unattractive for several reasons, including that they are more likely to highlight
inferior performance and that the value of indexed options has to be charged against earnings whereas
standard option awards only appear in the footnotes of ﬁnancial statements.
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) point out that aggregate shocks simultaneously raise ﬁrms’ values and
the marginal values of CEO services to ﬁrms. Given that the supply of talented CEO capable of running
large and complex corporations is relatively inelastic, these shocks bid up the value of their compensation
packages and make it appear as if RPE is violated. In a similar vein, Oyer (2003) points out that there
may be positive correlation between workers’ outside opportunities and ﬁrms’ market values. In such
an environment, when it is costly to revise labor contracts, a proﬁt sharing scheme that does not ﬁlter
out aggregate risk, is employed as a way to index compensation to market conditions and, therefore,
automatically meet workers’ participation constraints.
The previous works view performance-pay only as a means to provide executives with incentives to make
decisions in the interest of shareholders, but have disregarded its sorting eﬀects. Our paper diﬀers sub-
stantially from them because we take the complementary standpoint and analyze executive compensation
only as an instrument to sort managers of diﬀerent abilities. In doing so we subscribe to the widely held
view that executive compensation is designed more as a way to retain executives with superior abilities or
induce them to make decisions in the interest of shareholders, than as an attempt to provide lazy managers
with incentives to work hard.11
Despite the obvious modeling diﬀerences, we view our research as most related to Himmelberg and
Hubbard (2000) and Oyer (2003) because we also attempt to explain compensation schemes as arising from
executive labor market rather than from product market interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and introduces the equilibrium concept
used in the paper. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 studies the implications of the
equilibrium analysis of section 3 on the link between managerial pay and ﬁrms’ performance measures and
discusses an extension of the model in which a manager may be one of a ﬁnite number of types. Section 5
concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
A population of risk neutral ﬁrms compete for scarce risk averse managers. Each manager has private
information about his individual ability. To simplify the presentation we will assume that two ﬁrms compete
for every single manager. When a ﬁrm hires a manager it may have two possible realizations of revenue
(gross of executive pay), success, with revenue s>0, or failure, with 0 revenue. We denote the publicly
observable realization of revenue by P ∈ {F,S},w h e r eF and S indicate a failure or a success, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that only two types of managers exist, good and bad, τ ∈ {G,B}, and we denote
by µ ∈ (0,1) the probability that the manager is good. When a ﬁrm hires a bad manager, its probability
of success is p.W h e naﬁrm hires a good manager, its probability of success is p + γ,w i t hγ ∈ (0,1 − p)
which implies that the probability of success is higher when the ﬁrm is run by a good manager rather than
by a bad one. We normalize to e π<p sthe proﬁto faﬁrm that does not succeed in hiring a manager.





determines the probability of success of individual ﬁrms’ investment project. In the favorable
aggregate state, Π, the probability of success is p+γ>p+γ when the ﬁrm is run by a good manager and
p>pwhen the ﬁrm is run by a bad manager. In the unfavorable aggregate state, Π, the probability of
success is p +γ <p+γ when the ﬁrm is run by a good manager and p <pwhen the ﬁrm is run by a bad
manager. We denote the probability of state Π by β and the probability of state Π by β =1− β.G i v e n
that the unconditional probability of success is p +γ or p depending on the ﬁr mb e i n gr u nb yag o o do ra
11A c c o r d i n gt oM u r p h y( 1999, page 2521) “the reason shareholders entrust their money to self-interested CEOs is based on
shareholder beliefs that CEOs have superior skills or information in making investment decisions.” For similar arguments see
also Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), Ricart i Costa (1989), Core and Guay (2000), or Prendergast (2002).
4bad manager respectively, we have












Because the only purpose of assuming that a ﬁrm can function without a manager, although less eﬀectively,
is to establish reservation levels for ﬁrms, and given that we have no interest in the case of a ﬁrm that is not
run by a (specialized) manager, we need not make any assumptions on whether and how the probabilities
of success for a ﬁrm without a manager change as a function of the aggregate state.
Managers of both types maximize expected utility of wage payments. We denote their Bernoulli utility
function by U(w). For the sake of simplicity we study a situation in which (at most) one equilibrium
exists and is interior. For this purpose we assume that U(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, U
0 (.) > 0,
U
00 (w) < 0, and that the Inada conditions hold, limw→0+ U
0 (w)=+ ∞, limw→+∞ U
0 (w)=0 .
After managers learn their types, ﬁrms oﬀer contracts to managers. A contract speciﬁes that if the
manager accepts it, he will receive a nonnegative payment from the ﬁrm for each subsequent public history
of the game. Given that a contract oﬀered by a ﬁrm to a manager conditions the manager’s salary
on the public history of the game following acceptance, a contract has to specify a payment for every









, denotes the realization of the aggregate state. To simplify notation we will denote a contract
by
w =( wF,w S,wF,wS) ∈ R4
+
where wP (respectively, wP) denotes the nonnegative payment to the manager when the outcome of the
investment process is P ∈ {F,S} and when Π = Π (respectively, when Π = Π).
The informational structure described above portrays a situation in which both individual and aggregate
realizations convey information on the manager’s likely behavior and in which shareholders may ﬁnd it
optimal to make managerial compensation dependent on both individual and aggregate results. To avoid
unnecessary complications we assume that the aggregate state is directly observable. This means that
we ignore the straightforward statistical problem of inferring the likely aggregate state from industry
realizations and we concentrate on what ﬁrms may infer about a manager’s likely behavior from the
aggregate state and the implications that this may have on managerial compensation.
We assume that every manager is oﬀered a ﬁnite set of contracts w ∈ R4
+ by each of two ﬁrms and
chooses one contract (if any) from them. All our results generalize to the case in which the measure of the
set of managers is lower than the measure of the set of ﬁrms and ﬁrms are allowed to make oﬀers to all
managers.
In the following we summarize the extensive form of the game.
• Nature chooses the type of each manager. Managers’ types are i.i.d., and their realizations are G
with probability µ and B with probability 1 − µ.
• Each manager privately observes his type, τ.
• Without observing nature’s choices, each of the two ﬁrms competing for a given manager oﬀers him
a set of contracts, each of them of the form
w =( wF,wS,wF,wS) ∈ R4
+.
• The manager either accepts an oﬀer or rejects them all.
— If the manager rejects all oﬀers, he and the ﬁrms receive reservation utilities (respectively, 0 and
e π).
— If the manager accepts an oﬀer, he is hired. The ﬁrm whose oﬀers were not accepted receives
its reservation utility.
• Nature chooses
5— The aggregate state Π with probability β and Π with probability β.
— The realization of revenue (gross of executive compensation) for each ﬁrm that has hired a
manager, conditional on the aggregate state and on the type of the manager.
∗ If the aggregate state is Π and the manager is good, the realization will be S with probability
p + γ.
∗ If the aggregate state is Π and the manager is bad, the realization will be S with probability
p.
∗ If the aggregate state is Π and the manager is good, the realization will be S with probability
p + γ
∗ If the aggregate state is Π and the manager is bad, the realization will be S with probability
p.
• The realization of the investment project is publicly observed, P ∈ {F,S}.





• The ﬁrm pays the manager salary wP or wP when the public signal was Π or Π, respectively.
Given that no additional use of notation will be made, we choose not to provide a full description
of strategies and strategy spaces. Also, for notational convenience, we will occasionally omit arguments
whenever this cannot cause any confusion.
The equilibrium concept we use is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
Suppose that a manager has accepted a contract w =( wF,w S,wF,wS) ∈ R4
+. W ed e n o t eb yατ
P
the probability that the ﬁnal public outcome is (P,Π), P ∈ {F,S}, conditional on manager’s type being
τ. Similarly, we will denote by ατ




, P ∈ {F,S}
conditional on manager’s type being τ. The expected utility deriving from contract w =( wF,wS,wF,wS) ∈
R4






Marginal rates of substitution between salary payments in any two states of the world for a manager

















We now depict the indiﬀerence curves of the good and the bad manager in the planes (wF,wF) and
(wS,wS). Simple calculations show that for all w =( wF,w S,wF,wS) ∈ R4





that p>pand such that p + γ>p+ γ12
MRSG

























12Notice that we don’t necessarily impose that γ>γ .
6is equivalent to
Pr(F | τ = G,Π = Π)








F | τ = B,Π = Π
¢, (4)
which means that the failure is relatively more likely to derive from the good manager rather than the bad
in state Π than in state Π. Note that a bad manager has higher probability of failure in either aggregate
state, but condition (4) requires that the relative likelihood of failure deriving from the good rather than
the bad manager is higher in the favorable rather than in the unfavorable aggregate state.














S | τ = B,Π = Π
¢ >
Pr(S | τ = G,Π = Π)
Pr(S | τ = B,Π = Π)
. (6)
which means that success is relatively more likely to derive from the good manager rather than the bad one
in state Π than in state Π. As before, note that a bad manager has lower probability of success in either
aggregate state, but condition (6) is satisﬁed when the relative likelihood of success deriving from the good



























p, only (3) holds
Consider case (i). By (1)w eh a v e
MRSG
wF,wF (w) <MR S B
wF,wF (w) (7)
and by (2) we have
MRSG
wS,wS (w) >MR S B
wS,wS (w). (8)
Figure 1 depicts the indiﬀerence curves of the good and the bad manager in the planes (wF,wF) and
(wS,wS) for a given contract w =( wF,w S,wF,wS) in case (i). In such a case (7) and (8) imply that
the (absolute) slope of the indiﬀerence curve of the good manager in the plane (wF,wF) is higher than
that of the bad manager (Figure 1(a)) and that the (absolute) slope of the indiﬀerence curve of the good
manager in the plane (wS,wS) is lower than that of the bad manager (Figure 1(b)). In case (iii) the
indiﬀerence curves of types G and B in both ﬁgures would be inverted. In case (ii) the (absolute) slopes
of the indiﬀerence curves for the good manager would be higher than the corresponding sloped for the bad
manager in both planes.
For the purposes of presentation we prefer to focus our attention on one of the cases above. Recall that
the goal of the paper is to show that it is possible to have equilibria in which managers accept contracts
that are not monotonically decreasing in the aggregate state and therefore in aggregate performance. For
this reason in the rest of the paper we will focus our attention on case (i) in which such property holds.
We will then discuss how results are modiﬁed in cases (ii) and (iii).
The indiﬀerence curves in Figure 1(a) clarify that, conditional on the investment project being a failure,
the good type is more willing than the bad type to trade compensation when the aggregate state is
unfavorable against compensation when the aggregate state is favorable. Similarly, the indiﬀerence curves
in Figure 1(b) illustrate that, conditional on the investment project being successful, the good type is more
willing than the bad type to trade compensation when the aggregate state is favorable against compensation
when the aggregate state is unfavorable.





71.T y p eB does not prefer wRSW−G to wRSW−B;
2. Type G does not prefer wRSW−B to wRSW−G;
3. A ﬁrm that oﬀers wRSW−B at least breaks even when wRSW−B is accepted only by type B.
4. A ﬁrm that oﬀers wRSW−G at least breaks even when wRSW−G is accepted only by type G.
5. No pair of contracts exists that satisﬁes the previous conditions and is such that no type of manager




as the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) contracts in reference to the
work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) on insurance markets with adverse selection.13








s.t. E [π − w | B] ≥ ˜ π (9)
V G ¡
wG¢
≥ V G(w). (10)
wRSW−G¡
wB¢




s.t. E [π − w | G] ≥ ˜ π (11)
V B ¡
wB¢
≥ V B (w). (12)
In words, for a given wG, wRSW−B ¡
wG¢
is the contract that maximizes the expected payoﬀ to a bad
manager subject to the following two conditions (i) the expected payoﬀ to a ﬁrm that oﬀe r st h i sc o n t r a c t
and whose oﬀer is accepted only by the bad manager is no lower than the ﬁrm’s reservation level and (ii)
the good manager does not prefer this contract to wG. Similarly, for a given wB, wRSW−G¡
wB¢
is the
contract that maximizes the expected payoﬀ to a good manager subject to the following three conditions
(i) the expected payoﬀ to a ﬁrm that oﬀe r st h i sc o n t r a c ta n dw h o s eo ﬀer is accepted only by the good
manager is no lower than the ﬁrm’s reservation level and (ii) the bad manager does not prefer this contract
to wB.
We can now deﬁne the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson pair of contracts.
Definition 2 A pair of contracts is Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson,
¡
wRSW−B,wRSW−G¢
,i fa n do n l yi f
wRSW−B = wRSW−B ¡
wRSW−G¢
wRSW−G = wRSW−G ¡
wRSW−B¢
Notice that the break-even constraints in Deﬁnition 1 imply that wRSW−B 6= wRSW−G.
The following Proposition provides a characterization of RSW pair of contracts in case (i).
Proposition 1 In case (i) there exists a unique pair of contracts RSW and it is such that:






2. A good manager receives a wage that is









13We follow standard terminology. See for instance Maskin and Tirole (1992).











Proposition 1 establishes that the contract preferred by the bad manager, wRSW−B, is a constant con-
tract that insulates him from any source of risk. The contract preferred by the good manager, wRSW−G,
instead exposes him to risk in both own and aggregate performance. In particular compensation is (weakly)
increasing in own performance, but is not monotonically decreasing in aggregate performance. When in-
dividual performance is low (i.e., with failure) compensation is decreasing in aggregate performance. But
when individual performance is high (i.e., with success) compensation is increasing in aggregate perfor-
mance, in contrast to the form of RPE that is normally taken for granted.
Similar characterizations obtain for the other two cases. In case (ii) compensation for the good manager
will be monotonically decreasing in the aggregate performance. In case (iii), compensation for the good
manager will be decreasing in aggregate performance when individual performance is high, but increasing
in aggregate performance when individual performance is low.
The next proposition characterizes the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 I nt h ep a t ho fas u b g a m ep e r f e c tN a s he q u i l i b r i u m :
1. The bad manager accepts contract
wB = wRSW−B;
2. The good manager accepts contract
wG = wRSW−G.
Proof: Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows standard arguments. It ﬁrst establishes that in equilibrium ﬁrms
earn zero proﬁts on top of their reservation utility of e π. It then rules out the possibility of “pooling”
equilibria in which both types of managers accept the same contract by showing that it is always possible
to deviate and make an oﬀer that would be accepted only by the good manager and which earns the ﬁrm
positive proﬁts. Finally, it shows that all “separating” oﬀers diﬀerent from the RSW contracts are also
vulnerable to the same type of deviation. This shows that if a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, it
has to be such that the two types of managers accept the RSW contracts. These results are reminiscent of
the results on insurance with adverse selection of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977).
Part 2 states that if a subgame perfect Nash equilibriums exists, the contract accepted by the good
manager is such that his compensation is higher in states with a higher likelihood of the good manager
relative to the bad. As in the principal-agent literature, this result evokes a statistical interpretation, but
no actual statistical inference is drawn in equilibrium given that, once a manager has accepted contract
wRSW−G, he is known to be good with probability 1.
To understand Proposition 2 consider again case (i). In this case, the likelihood of individual success and
a favorable aggregate state relative to individual success and an unfavorable aggregate state is higher for
a good manager than a bad one. This implies that a good manager is more willing than a bad manager to
trade compensation in the event of individual success and a favorable aggregate state against compensation
in the event of individual success and an unfavorable aggregate state. This means that competition forces
ﬁrms to oﬀer a contract for the good manager with higher compensation in the ﬁrst event than in the
second.


























i.e., GG,t h ei n d i ﬀerence curve of the good manager, is less steep at wRSW−G than gg, the set of contracts
that have the same expected cost as wRSW−G conditioned on only the good manager accepting it. Consider






is replaced by (w0
S,w0
S) below
gg,b e l o wBB,a n da b o v eGG. This contract is strictly better for the good manager, strictly worse for
the bad manager and is such that the expected compensation cost, conditional on only the good manager
accepting it, is no higher than the expected compensation cost of wRSW−G. This means that a proﬁtable





Notice that the same argument does not apply when wRSW−G
S ≥ wRSW−G
S , as for instance in point W1
in Figure 2. In this case, gg, the set of contracts that have the same expected cost as wRSW−G conditioned
on only the good manager accepting it, is less steep than GG, the indiﬀerence curve of the good manager.
Given that GG is less steep than BB, the set of contracts that are more proﬁtable than W1 conditional
on only the good manager accepting it, and above GG are also above BB. In other words, the contracts
that lie above GG and below gg, also lie above BB.
In a similar way, the likelihood of individual failure and a favorable aggregate state relative to individual
failure and an unfavorable aggregate state is lower for a good manager than a bad one. This implies that a
good manager is more willing than a bad manager to trade compensation in the event of individual failure
and an unfavorable aggregate state against compensation in the event of individual failure and a favorable
aggregate state. This means that competition forces ﬁrms to oﬀer a contract for the good manager with
higher compensation in the ﬁrst event than in the second.
Note that this result does not depend on renegotiation and managers’ outside opportunities being
correlated with the market, because we assume that managers have commitment ability when they accept
a contract. Instead, the result derives from the fact that ﬁrms’ oﬀe r sh a v et oe x h a u s tt h ep o s s i b l eg a i n s
deriving from oﬀers that separate good managers from bad ones promising diﬀerent payments in diﬀerent
states of nature.
It is important to clarify that Proposition 2 does not establish existence of a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, because it shows that proﬁtable deviations that attract only the good manager exist for all
contracts diﬀerent from the RSW contracts. When the RSW contracts are oﬀered, such a deviation is not
proﬁtable, but other deviations may be, in which case no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. To see
this, notice ﬁr s tt h a tn op r o ﬁtable deviation may exist that is such that only the bad manager accepts a
diﬀerent contract, because wRSW−B is the contract that the bad manager prefers among all contracts that
break even. This means that if a contract is oﬀered that the bad manager strictly prefers to wRSW−B,i t
has to give negative expected proﬁt. But two other types of deviations may be proﬁtable:
1. A deviation that is such that both types accept the same contract. In this case the ﬁrm makes a
positive proﬁt if the manager is good and a negative proﬁt if the manager is bad.
2. A deviation that is such that each of the two types accepts a diﬀerent contract. In this case the
deviation has to be such that the ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt if the manager is good and a negative
proﬁt if the manager is bad.14
While it is impossible to guarantee that such deviations are in general unproﬁtable, a suﬃcient condition
for that to happen is that the probability of the manager being good is not too high. Note that the possibility
that an equilibrium does not exist for certain parameter constellations is pervasive in models of contracting
with adverse selection and has been the object of careful analysis. We do not want to review the literature
on the issue, but we want to mention that under appropriate modiﬁcations of the extensive form of the
game, equilibria exist in which the main results of this paper hold.
14A deviation that is such that each of the two types accepts a diﬀerent contract and such that the ﬁrm makes a negative
proﬁt if the manager is good and a positive proﬁt if the manager is bad is dominated by a deviation in which only the bad
manager accepts a diﬀerent contract and this type of deviation has already been argued to be unproﬁtable.
10Maskin and Tirole (1992) have analyzed a situation in which the informed party (the manager in our
case) oﬀers a set of contracts to the uninformed party (the ﬁrm); the latter may accept the set or reject
it; if the uninformed party accepts the set of contracts, the informed party then chooses one contract from
this set. With this extensive form, the RSW allocation described in Proposition 2 would be the unique
equilibrium outcome.
Hellwig (1987) modiﬁes the extensive form by introducing an extra stage in which after the informed
party has accepted a contract, the uninformed party may withdraw the contract (if it believes that it will
lead to a loss). If we also introduced an additional stage in which ﬁrms can withdraw oﬀers that have been
accepted, an equilibrium would always exist. In particular, if an equilibrium does not exist in which the
managers accept the RSW contracts, an equilibrium exists in which both types of managers accept the
same contract. The contract accepted in this equilibrium would be the contract that the good manager
most prefers among all contract that break even when accepted by both types. But as for the case of the
RSW contract for the good type, in case (i), the contract accepted by both types would be decreasing in the
aggregate state when own performance is low and increasing in the aggregate state when own performance
is high.
4 Discussion of the results
4.1 When does the described technology arise?
The purpose of this subsection is to show that the assumptions on the joint probability distribution over
own and aggregate performance hold in a simple, unsophisticated setting. Suppose that each ﬁrm has two
investment projects available, I and II. Each project, if undertaken, has two possible realizations, success,
with revenue r = s>0 and failure, with revenue r =0 . The prior probability of project I resulting in
success is p. The prior probability that project II results in success is q. Assume that p>q , i.e., project
I is ex-ante eﬃcient, and that q>0, i.e., the expected revenue from each project is strictly positive15.
Assume that ﬁrms’ reservation level, e π, is strictly lower than qs, the expected revenue with the ex-ante
inferior project.




determines the probability of success of investment project I
for each individual ﬁrm. In the favorable aggregate state Π the probability of success is p>pand in the
unfavorable aggregate state Π the probability of success is p <p . Recalling that the probability of state Π










determines the probability of success of individual
ﬁrms’ investment project II. In the favorable aggregate state Π the probability of success is q>qand in






Managers have innate abilities to forecast the realization of some projects. For simplicity we assume that
only two types of managers exist, good and bad, τ ∈ {G,B}. When a good manager is employed by a ﬁrm,
he is able to forecast the realization of investment project I, whereas a bad manager is unable to improve
his forecast beyond the prior probabilities of success. For the sake of simplicity we assume that neither
good nor bad managers are able to make any forecast about the realization of project II.G i v e n t h a t
project I is ex-ante superior to project II, this assumption could be justiﬁed if, for instance, the manager
could devote a limited amount of time to the analysis of investment projects and it were optimal for him
to dedicate it to project I.
Each manager knows his own type, but it is common knowledge that ﬁrms believe that he is good
with probability µ and bad with probability 1−µ. When analyzing project I, a manager receives a signal
ρ ∈ {V,L,H}. The bad manager receives signal V , the void signal, with probability 1 and the good
15Notice that q>0 implies p>0.
11manager receives signals L or H, the low and the high signal, with probabilities 1 − p and p, respectively.
The probability of project I having the high return (s>0) conditional on the received signal is




p if ρ = V
0 if ρ = L
1 if ρ = H
.
In other words, while signals H and L ensure, respectively, the success or the failure of investment project
I,t h ev o i ds i g n a l ,V , provides no additional information and the conditional probability of success is,
therefore, equal to the prior, p.16
Our assumption guarantee that it is always eﬃcient to undertake one investment project, be it I or
II. We can restrict the manager’s action space to {I,II}. We assume that the manager’s choice of the
project is not observable but its ultimate realization is. As before we denote the observable ﬁnal outcome
of the investment project by P ∈ {F,S},w h e r eF and S indicate a failure (revenue equal to 0) or a success
(revenue equal to s). An investment proﬁl ef o ram a n a g e ri sav e c t o ri =( iV ,i L,i H) ∈ {I,II}3 where
iV ,i L and iH denote the decision to invest in project I or II when the signal received by the manager is
respectively V , L,o rH.W e d e n o t e b y iE =( I,II,I) the eﬃcient investment proﬁle. It is then easy to
show that if the manager plays the eﬃcient investment proﬁle, the probabilities of success and failure for




.T h i sm e a n st h a t ,

















Notice that the second inequality clariﬁes that the relative likelihood of success deriving from the good
manager rather than the bad is higher in the favorable aggregate state, because, when the manager plays
the eﬃcient investment proﬁle, success is relatively less likely to derive form project I rather than II in
state Π than in state Π and the manager chooses project II only when he is good.








and that case (iii) could arise if q<q , i.e., if the aggregate state that has been termed favorable, Π,i s
favorable for project I but not for project II.
The previous discussion has clariﬁed that when managers make eﬃcient investment decisions, the prob-
ability distributions that were postulated in the paper arise. But if managers can choose one investment
project or the other, it would of course be necessary to verify that they want to make eﬃcient investment
decisions in equilibrium and that the possibility of deviation in the investment decision do not have an
impact on the contracts which are accepted in equilibrium and therefore on the equilibrium distributions
over salaries and individual and aggregate performance. We have explicitly analyzed this issue in a previous
version of this paper and we have found that no change occurs on the contracts accepted in equilibrium
and therefore on equilibrium distributions over payoﬀs.
4.2 An example
We now consider the case in which the manager has constant relative risk aversion, U(c)=c1−σ
1−σ ,w i t h
σ =0 .5. We assume that probabilities of success are p =0 .6, p =0 .7, p =0 .5, q =0 .35, q =0 .01,t h a t
the favorable and the unfavorable aggregate states are equally likely β = β =0 .5, that revenue under
success is s =3 0 ,a n dt h a tﬁrms’ reservation level is e π =1 2 . Notice that these parameter values satisfy
the conditions of the model and in particular are such that (5) holds so that wRSW−G
S >w RSW−G
S .
16Managers with high ability are often described in the literature as being able to generate high expected return investment
projects, i.e., as being able to come up with good ideas. In contrast to this, we refer to managerial ability as the ability to
forecast the realization of a given project. All investment projects are drawn from the same distribution, regardless of the
manager’s ability, but diﬀerent managers may have diﬀerent abilities to forecast their realizations.
12The purpose of this example is to show that when (5) holds, and, therefore, when wRSW−G
S >w RSW−G
S ,
the aggregate relationship between executive compensation and market movements may be positive. This
may help explain the apparently disconcerting empirical evidence on RPE that has been discussed in the
introduction.























The bad manager accepts a constant contract that fully insures him. The good manager accepts a contract
which gives him compensation which is increasing in own performance, decreasing in industry performance
when individual performance is low, but increasing in industry performance when individual performance
is high. In other words, the good manager receives higher compensation when ﬁrm performance is in line
with industry performance.
We now analyze whether the RSW contracts derived above may lead to a positive relationship between
executive compensation and aggregate performance. To do this we compute the joint probability distribu-
tions over executives’ salaries, ﬁrms’ own proﬁts, and industry proﬁts generated by equilibrium play. We
then compute the population best linear predictor of salaries conditioned on ﬁrm proﬁts (FP) and industry
proﬁts (IP)
E [w | FP,IP]=β0 + β1 · FP + β2 · IP (13)
Notice that the previous speciﬁcation omits information about the type of the manager but replicates
the speciﬁcations of most empirical studies on executive compensation. We have repeated the exercise for
diﬀerent values of the prior probability of the manager being good and we have always found the same
qualitative results. In Table 1 we report the estimation results for ﬁve diﬀerent values of the probability
of being good. In columns 2 to 4 we report the regression coeﬃcients. The results summarized in Table 1,
suggest that wages are increasing in own performance (column 3) but they are also increasing in industry
performance (column 4).
This result appears as a violation of the shape that is normally taken for granted for RPE but is
consistent with the results documented by the empirical literature. In other words our model clariﬁes that
asymmetric information on executive talent and competition in the market for executives can generate a
distribution of outcomes that is consistent with existing empirical studies.
4.3 Extension: T types of managers
The model we have used so far has made the assumption that only two types of managers exist, good
and bad. The purpose of this subsection is to clarify that this assumption is made only for the sake of
simplicity and that our results can be obtained with an arbitrary but ﬁnite number of types of executives.
Here we propose an extension of the model described in section 4.1.
Assume that a manager can be of type τ = {1,......,T} and that each type τ gets a signal ρ ∈ {L,H}
about the realization of project I.T y p e s d i ﬀer in the informativeness of the signal they receive. In
particular, assume that type τ has probability λ(τ) of receiving a high signal when project I is destined
to success and to receive a low signal when project I is doomed to failure and that









Notice that λ(τ) is increasing in τ,t h a tλ(T)=1and that
λ(1) =
p(1 − q)





This implies that higher types receive more informative signals, that the best type, T, is able to perfectly
forecast the realization of project I and that the worst possible type, 1, receives a signal which has positive
although limited informativeness about the realization of project I.
13The probability of project I having the high return (s>0) conditional on the high signal is
Pr(r = s | ρ = H,I,τ)=
λ(τ)p
λ(τ)p +( 1− λ(τ))(1 − p)
and the probability of project I having the high return (s>0) conditional on the low signal is
Pr(r = s | ρ = L,I,τ)=
(1 − λ(τ))p
(1 − λ(τ))p + λ(τ)(1− p)
Given that λ(τ) is increasing in τ, Pr(r = s | ρ = L,I,τ) is decreasing in τ. Notice also that for the best
type τ = T
Pr(r = s | ρ,I,T)=
½
1 if ρ = H
0 if ρ = L
and for the worst type τ =1 ,
Pr(r = s | ρ,I,1) =
(
p2(1−q)
p2(1−q)+(1−p)2q if ρ = H
q if ρ = L
Because Pr(r = s | ρ = L,I,τ =1 )=q,w eh a v et h a tf o ra l lτ>1
Pr(r = s | ρ = L,I,τ) <q .
From the above it follows that, if executive compensation is increasing in absolute performance (which
implies that the manager wants to maximize expected absolute performance) all types of manager prefer
to invest in project I if they receive the high signal, ρ = H,t h a ta l lτ>1 prefer to invest in II if they
receive the low signal and that only the worst type τ =1is indiﬀerent between investing in project I or II
if he receives the low signal. Assume, that when indiﬀerent between project I and II,t y p eτ =1chooses
project I,a n dl e tiE denote the eﬃcient investment proﬁle that speciﬁes that type τ =1always invests in
project I,a n dt h a ta l lt y p e sτ>1 invest in project I when they receive the high signal, and in project II
when they receive the low signal.
Under the assumptions on the joint distribution of individual and aggregate states made in 3, straight-
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Given that conditions (14) and (15) generalize conditions (1) and (2) for the two-type model of section
3, it is easy to see that the same qualitative results could be obtained in the case of an arbitrary but ﬁnite
number of types.
145C o n c l u s i o n
We present a simple theoretical model that attempts to explain the apparent lack of empirical support
for a negative relationship between top executive compensation and market movements. We analyze an
adverse selection environment in which contingent executive compensation may be used to sort heteroge-
neous managers. We ﬁnd that equilibrium contracts include RPE considerations, but their form may diﬀer
from that which is stipulated by the existing literature. In particular we show that good managers accept
contracts that may make larger payments when the aggregate state is favorable rather than unfavorable. In
other words, we ﬁnd in a very simple setting that executive compensation is not necessarily decreasing with
industry performance. An example shows that this eﬀect may lead to a positive relationship between exec-
utive compensation and aggregate performance and that our results may resolve the apparent discrepancy
between the empirical and the theoretical literature.
Most of the literature on executive compensation has concentrated on contingent contracts as tools to
endow managers with incentives to make appropriate decisions. In this paper we take the opposite viewpoint
and analyze a situation in which contingent compensation is used to sort heterogeneous managers. But,
as is commonly the case with contracts in asymmetric information environments, similar results could
be obtained in a moral hazard setting. It would obviously be important to determine whether executive
compensation can be explained better by moral hazard or adverse selection.17 But the contribution of
our paper is to show that a standard competitive model can explain why executive compensation may be
increasing in market movements.
Our focus on adverse selection also suggests ways in which future empirical research may overcome the
problems encountered by the empirical research on moral hazard models of executive compensation that
was emphasized by Antle and Smith (1986): “A limitation of any method of inferring contract structure
from data is that only the payments under equilibrium behavior are realized. Yet an important part of any
incentive scheme is the implied consequence of departing from equilibrium behavior”18. This limitation
applies to models of moral hazard, because for each observable realization, compensation depends on the
likelihood of the equilibrium action relative to the action that makes the incentive compatibility constraint
binding. While data can be used to estimate the probability distribution over observable realizations
conditional on the equilibrium action, this is impossible for the actions which are not taken in equilibrium
and this leaves researchers guessing the form of the optimal compensation scheme.
The same argument does not apply to adverse selection environments. In these settings, the equilibrium
compensation of a good manager for a given observable realization depends on the likelihood of the good
manager relative to the bad one. This means that if the data makes it possible to distinguish good managers
from bad, then it is also possible to estimate the probability distributions over observable realizations for
each type of manager. This would ultimately allow the empirical researcher to estimate the likelihood of
the good manager relative to the bad one for each observable realization and determine whether observed
executive compensation schemes can be explained by adverse selection arguments.
17Recent research has tried to distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance data. See for instance,
Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman, and Pinquet (2003) and their references.
18Antle and Smith (1986), page 8 (footnote 23).
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17A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 1 In case (i) there exists a pair of contracts RSW and it is such that:
1. wRSW−B =( ( ps − e π),(ps − e π),(ps − e π),(ps − e π))
2. wRSW−G 6= wRSW−B

















Proof: The expected proﬁts gross of compensation generated by the two types of manager are
E [π | G]=( p + γ)s>e π
E [π | B]=ps > e π
with
E [π | G] >E[π | B]. (16)
Given that U
0 (.) > 0, constraints (9) and (11)h a v et ob es a t i s ﬁed with equality. This implies that wRSW−G
cannot be a constant contract, because if it were, type B would prefer it to any contract satisfying (9).
We now want to show that (10) cannot be satisﬁed with equality. To see this, notice that an upper
bound on the utility that type G could get from accepting wRSW−B is the utility he would get by accepting
a constant contract satisfying (9) with equality, i.e.,
w =( ( ps − e π),(ps − e π),(ps − e π),(ps − e π)).
Suppose that the good manager accepts this contract and consider the indiﬀerence curves of the two types
of manager passing through w on the (wS,wS) plane as depicted in Figure 3. Notice that given that the
good manager generates a higher expected proﬁt, his break-even line, gg, lies strictly above w.F i g u r e 3
s h o w st h a tt h ec o n t r a c t st h a td i ﬀer from w in that (wS,wS)=( ps − e π,ps− e π) is replaced by a pair strictly
above GG ,s t r i c t l yb e l o wBB and below gg are strictly better for type G and strictly worse for type B.
This implies that (10) cannot be satisﬁed with equality.
Given that (10) is slack type B’s risk aversion implies that wRSW−B is constant and satisﬁes (9) with
equality so that
wRSW−B =( ( ps − e π),(ps − e π),(ps − e π),(ps − e π))
as in Part 1.G i v e nt h a twRSW−G cannot be constant, Part 2 follows.
To prove part 3 notice ﬁrst that simple calculations show that
MRSG
wS,wS (w) >M R S B
wS,wS (w)
MRSG
wF,wF (w) <M R S B
wF,wF (w)
Given this, to prove part 3, it suﬃces to show that for any two states σ0 and σ00:
MRSG
w(σ0),w(σ00) (w) >MR S B
w(σ0),w(σ00)(w)
implies that
wRSW−G (σ00) ≥ wRSW−G (σ0) (17)
18and
MRSG
w(σ0),w(σ00) (w) <MR S B
w(σ0),w(σ00)(w)
implies that
wRSW−G(σ00) ≤ wRSW−G(σ0). (18)
Contrary to (17) suppose that in equilibrium wRSW−G (σ00) <w RSW−G (σ0),s u c ha sf o ri n s t a n c eW2 in






when w(σ00)=w(σ0) , wRSW−G(σ00) <w RSW−G(σ0) implies that
MRSG




i.e., GG,t h ei n d i ﬀerence curve of the good manager, is less steep at wRSW−G than gg, the set of contracts
that have the same expected cost as wRSW−G conditioned on only the good manager accepting it. Con-
sider now a contract b w which diﬀers from wRSW−G in that
¡
wRSW−G (σ0),w RSW−G (σ00)
¢
is replaced by
(b w(σ0), b w(σ00)) below gg,b e l o wBB and above GG. This contract is strictly better for the good manager
and strictly worse for the bad manager and is such that the expected compensation cost, conditional on
only the good manager accepting it, is no higher than the expected compensation cost of w∗.T h i s i m -
plies that contract b w gives a higher expected utility to the good manager while satisfying (11)a n d( 12) a
contradiction to the hypothesis that wRSW−G could be such that wRSW−G(σ00) <w RSW−G(σ0).
Notice that the same argument does not apply when wRSW−G (σ00) ≥ wRSW−G (σ0), such as for instance
point W1 in Figure 4. In this case, gg, the set of contracts that have the same expected cost as wG
conditioned on only the good manager accepting it, is less steep than GG, the indiﬀerence curve of the
good manager. Given that GG is less steep than BB, the set of contracts that are more proﬁtable than
W1 conditional on only the good manager accepting it, and above GG are also above BB.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
the contracts that lie above GG and below gg, such as contract (e w(σ0), e w(σ00)), also lie above BB.T h i s
implies that this contract would violate (12).
Part (18): Similar arguments apply to this case. We will not repeat the full argument, but inspection of
Figure 5 should clarify that when MRSG
w(σ0),w(σ00) (w) <MR S B
w(σ0),w(σ00)(w), wRSW−G cannot be like W3
and can be like W4. Suppose ﬁrst that wRSW−G is such wRSW−G (σ0) <w RSW−G (σ00),a si np o i n tW3





replaced by (b w(σ0), b w(σ00)), that lies below gg,b e l o wBB and above GG would improve upon wRSW−G
for type G while satisfying (11)a n d( 12).
Suppose instead that wRSW−G is such wRSW−G(σ0) ≥ wRSW−G (σ00) ,a si np o i n tW4 in Figure 5.





(e w(σ0), e w(σ00)), that lies below gg and above GG.G i v e n t h a t GG is steeper than BB,h o w e v e r ,a l l
contracts that lie on or below gg and above GG,s u c ha s(e w(σ0), e w(σ00)), also lie above BB and therefore
violate (12).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove Proposition 2 through a sequence of Lemmas.
Lemma 2 In a SPNE ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts are e π.
Proof: Immediate from a standard Bertrand pricing argument.
Lemma 3 No SPNE exists in which both types accept the same contract.
Proof: Contrary to the claim suppose that there is a SPNE in which both types of managers accept a
given contract w∗. By Lemma 2, if this contract is accepted in equilibrium by both types of managers,
19the payoﬀ to a ﬁrm oﬀering it is e π. Without loss of generality assume that the manager accepts such a
contract oﬀered by ﬁrm 1.
Notice that because the probability distributions over ﬁnal outcomes depend on the manager’s type,
there has to exist a pair of states (σ0,σ00) such that MRSτ
w(σ0),w(σ00) (w∗) 6= MRSτ0
w(σ0),w(σ00)(w∗).I nt h e




Consider the following 3 cases:
1. The expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm whose oﬀer w∗ is accepted by type τ is πτ > e π.
Consider Figure 6, depicting TT and T0T0, the indiﬀerence curves for types τ and τ0 passing through
(w∗ (σ0),w ∗ (σ00)) and ττ, the set of contracts diﬀering from w∗ only in that (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)) is
replaced by (w(σ0),w(σ00)) and that conditional on being accepted only by type τ have the same
expected proﬁta sw∗ when this is accepted by both types, i.e., e π. Notice that given that πτ > e π,
line ττ lies strictly above (w∗ (σ0),w ∗ (σ00)). This implies, that there are pairs that lie below ττ
above TT and below T0T0. This means that if ﬁrm 2 oﬀers a contract diﬀering from w∗ only in
that (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)) is replaced by a pair such as (e w(σ0), e w(σ00)) in Figure 6, it would get a proﬁt
strictly larger than e π because this contract would be accepted by type τ only. Given that this oﬀer
would be a proﬁtable deviation for ﬁrm 2, a contradiction arises. Notice that while Figure 6 depicts
ac a s ei nw h i c hw∗ (σ00) >w ∗ (σ0), this inequality is inessential for the result, because the result
depends on the diﬀerence between the marginal rates of substitution of the two type of manager and
the fact that ττ, the break-even line for type τ,lies strictly above point (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)) b u ti td o e s
not depend on the relative magnitudes of the slopes of TT and ττ.
2. The expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm whose oﬀer w∗ is accepted by type τ is πτ < e π.
By Lemma 2 the expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm whose oﬀer w∗ is accepted by type τ0 is
πτ0 =
e π − Pr(τ)πτ
1 − Pr(τ)
> e π.
Consider Figure 7, depicting TT and T0T0, the indiﬀerence curves for types τ and τ0 passing through
(w∗ (σ0),w ∗ (σ00)) and τ0τ0, the set of contracts diﬀering from w∗ only in that (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)) is
replaced by (w(σ0),w(σ00)) and that conditional on being accepted only by type τ0 have the same
expected proﬁta sw∗ when this is accepted by both types, i.e., e π. Notice that given that πτ0 > e π,
τ0τ0 lies strictly above (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)). This implies, that there are pairs that lie below τ0τ0 above
T0T0 and below TT. This means that if ﬁrm 2 oﬀers a contract diﬀering from w∗ only in that
(w∗ (σ0),w ∗ (σ00)) is replaced by a pair such as (e w(σ0), e w(σ00)) in Figure 7, it would get a proﬁt
strictly larger than e π because this contract would be accepted by type τ0 only. Given that this oﬀer
would be a proﬁtable deviation for ﬁrm 2, a contradiction arises. As before, notice that Figure 7
depicts a case in which w∗ (σ00) >w ∗ (σ0), but this inequality is inessential for the result. In fact
the result holds despite the fact that w∗ (σ00) >w ∗ (σ0) implies that T0T0 is steeper at w∗ than τ0τ0,
because τ0τ0 lies strictly above point (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)).
3. The expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm whose oﬀer w∗ is accepted by type τ is πτ = e π.
By Lemma 2 the expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm whose oﬀer w∗ is accepted by type τ0 is
πτ0 =
e π − Pr(τ)πτ
1 − Pr(τ)
= e π.
Notice that w∗ cannot be a constant contract, because otherwise πτ 6= πτ0. This implies that there
have to be two states of nature, σ0 and σ00 such that the salaries are diﬀerent from each other
w∗ (σ0) 6= w∗ (σ00). Without loss of generality suppose that w∗ (σ00) >w ∗ (σ0) and recall that we are
assuming that MRSτ
w(σ0),w(σ00) (w∗) <MR S τ0






20when w(σ00)=w(σ0) , w∗ (σ00) >w ∗ (σ0) implies that
MRSτ




i.e., TT, the indiﬀerence curve of type τ, is steeper at w∗ than ττ, the set of contracts that have
the same expected cost as w∗ conditioned on only type τ accepting it. Consider now a contract w0
which diﬀers from w∗ in that (w∗ (σ0),w∗ (σ00)) is replaced by (e w(σ0), e w(σ00)) below ττ,b e l o wT0T0
and above TT, as shown in Figure 8. This contract is strictly better for type τ and strictly worse
for τ0 and is such that the expected proﬁt, conditional on only type τ accepting it, is higher than e π,
the expected proﬁtf r o mo ﬀering w∗ and having it accepted by both types. This implies that oﬀering
contract w0 would be a proﬁtable deviation for ﬁrm 2, and a contradiction arises.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 2.
From Lemma 3 we know that in the path of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium types B and G accept
diﬀerent contracts, wB and wG. This requires that
V G ¡
wG¢
≥ V G (w) (19)
V B ¡
wB¢
≥ V B (w). (20)
From Lemma 2 we know that ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts are e π a n dt h i si m p l i e st h a t
E [π − w | G]=e π (21)











Notice that given that (10) is slack, wRSW−B maximizes type B’s utility subject to (9) and this implies
that the utility to B with wRSW−B can be no lower than the utility from wB. This in turn implies that
the utility to G with wRSW−B can be no lower than the utility from wG. Given (23), moreover the utility
to at least one of the two types has to be strictly lower than with
¡
wRSW−B,wRSW−G¢
.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
there exists a contract that is no worse for any of the two types, is strictly better for at least one of the two
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µβ 0 β1 β2
0.2500 5.3851 0.0365 0.0225
0.3660 5.1568 0.0533 0.0289
0.5000 4.9306 0.0727 0.0336
0.6340 4.7360 0.0920 0.0360
0.7500 4.5919 0.1087 0.0364
30